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THE UNREASONABLY UNSAFE PRODUCT AND
STRICT LIABILITY
JERRY J. PHILLIPS*

INTRODUCTION

The American Law Institute is currently considering a revision of
the law of products liability, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability (hereinafter, the Restatement (Third))', and especially a revision of the strict liability provision of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts: Products Liability (hereinafter, the Restatement (Second) section 402A), which is based on consumer expectations as the standard
of liability. The Reporters believe that consumer expectations as a
test of liability.is too vague and open-ended, and that it has bred confusion in the courts. They also think that the scope of liability needs
to be sharply restricted.
The consumer expectations test as a unitary basis of liability basically looks to the question of whether a product is unreasonably unsafe-without more. Such a standard, the Reporters believe, would
result in category, generic, or per se liability-all very bad things, according to the Reporters. In their opinion, this "subjective" test gives
too much discretion to the factfinder to make policy decisions that
should be reserved exclusively for the legislature.
The Reporters would divide product defects into three discrete
categories: (1) manufacturing flaws, (2) design defects, and (3) inadequate warnings. 2 In a separate provision, they provide for commercial-distributor liability for product misrepresentation. 3 They insist
that these categories are mutually exclusive.
The Reporters would retain strict liability for manufacturing
flaws and misrepresentation. But for failure-to-warn and design de* W.P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee
1. The versions of the proposed RESTATEMENT relied on in this Article are Tentative Draft
No. 2 (March 13, 1995) and Preliminary Draft No. 3 (May 18, 1995). A more recent Council
Draft No. 3 (November 15, 1995) makes no significant changes relating to the matters discussed
in this Article. Nor does the Proposed Final Draft (Preliminary Version) (October 18, 1996).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THMD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiAB Ur-y § 2(a)-(c) (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995).
3. See RESTATEMENT (THmID) OF TORTS: PRODUcrs LIABILrrY § 16 (Preliminary Draft
No. 3, 1995); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 16 (Council
Draft No. 3, 1995).
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fects, they place the standard of liability squarely in negligence. A
product is defective in design only when the "foreseeable risks of
harm" of a product "could have been reduced or avoided" by the
seller's adoption of a "reasonable alternative design" at the time of
sale or distribution. 4 A product is defective because of inadequate
warnings only when the "foreseeable risks of harm" could have been
reduced or avoided by the seller's provision of "reasonable instructions or warnings" at the time of sale or distribution. 5 These negligence standards for design and warning liability sit ill with the
inclusion of nonmanufacturing sellers within the definition of potential product defendants. 6
Thus, there are three features that stand out in the Reporters'
proposals for the Restatement (Third): (1) consumer expectations
should be abandoned as the basic test for determining product defectiveness in design and warning; (2) there should be no strict liability
for design or warning; and (3) the general test for determining design
defectiveness requires the plaintiff to prove the availability of a "reasonable alternative design" at the time of sale or distribution of the
7
product.
The eye of the controversy centers on design liability, where most
of modern products litigation is perceived to be focused. The Reporters propose a negligence standard, with the burden on the plaintiff to
prove a reasonable alternative design, in order to recover for design
defectiveness. 8 This standard considerably tightens the standard of recovery against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant.
Much has been written about whether the Reporters' proposed
design standards represent the majority view in this country.9 It is
probably fair to say that they do not. But neither did the Restatement
(Second)'s section 402A represent the majority view when it was
adopted in 1965. The Reporters were not then trying to restate the
law, but to direct it in the way they thought it should go. The Reporters are now working towards the same goal. The fundamental issue is
not whether the Reporters are accurately restating the law in this case,
but whether they are trying to steer the law in the right direction. The
proposal fails on this fundamental issue.
4.
1995).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

RESTATEMENT

(THiRD)

OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILrry §

Id. § 2(c).
See id. § 5.
Id. § 2(b).
See id.
See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 108-09.

2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2,

19961

THE UNREASONABLY

UNSAFE PRODUCT

The Reporters are trying to tighten and narrowly define products
liability, with a distinctive pro-defense bias applied in the process.
Products law, and tort law in general, do not in fact presently reflect
such a straitjacket approach, nor should they.' 0 The common law in
this area is a fact-sensitive, flexible, evolving system that attempts to
reflect the complexities of real life. The law should not be restricted
by theories that do not reflect reality.

I.

DESIGN DEFECT AS A SEPARATE CATEGORY

A.

Category Overlap-ManufacturingFlaws

While it is true that courts often pigeon-hole product inadequacies into discrete categories of manufacturing, design, warning, and
misrepresentation flaws, these categories are not discretely defined in
practice. A distinct-category analysis is artificial, and contrary to the
fact-specific approach of tort law.
The Reporters readily concede that liability should be imposed
for manufacturing defects "even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product."" The plaintiff
need not prove that a safer preparation and marketing process was
possible, and indeed the defendant cannot exonerate itself by showing
that such a safer process was impossible.
Most people think the difference between a manufacturing and a
design flaw is readily determinable-in much the same way, presumably, as Justice Potter Stewart thought hard-core and soft-core pornography could be readily distinguished. 12 The person on the street
would say the manufacturing defect is a random flaw-departing from
the manufacturer's "intended design", as the Reporters say13-while
the design flaw affects a whole line of products.
But what is a "whole line" of products? Is it a single batch? Suppose the manufacturer changes her design after an initial production
10. See infra Part II.
11. RESTATEMENT (TImRD)OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995). This is the majority rule. See, e.g., Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d
Cir. 1967). Some courts might make an exception for prescription drugs, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1977), or for products that meet the so-called state of the
art, see TENN. CODE ANN.§ 29-28-105 (1980). The proposed Restatement (Third) makes no such
exceptions, however, in the case of manufacturing flaws. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 2, 8 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
12. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
13. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2(a) (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:129

of say six or sixteen, or sixty products. Are the before-change products a separate design?
The quantity of defective products produced cannot be the key to
the distinction between manufacturing and design flaws, although the
Reporters seem to suggest that this is the critical distinction. 14 The
implications of design defectiveness are much more far-reaching for
the manufacturer; but then, the implications are much more far-reaching for the consumer as well.
The Reporters say that a manufacturing defect is one that departs
from the product's "intended design."' 15 They pick up on this idea in
section 3, where they state that a product defect may be inferred
"without proof of the specific nature of the defect" when the harm is
"of a kind that ordinarily would occur only as the result of [a] product
defect.' 6 In comment b to section 3 they state that the section will
"most often apply to manufacturing defects," although "occasionally a
product design causes the product to malfunction in a manner identical to that which would ordinarily be caused by a manufacturing defect."'1 7 Thus, they say, "an aircraft may inadvertently be designed in
such a way that, while flying within its intended performance parameters, the wings suddenly and unexpectedly fall off," causing injury. 8
In such a case, "it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove with precision whether the failure resulted from a manufacturing defect or from
a fatal shortcoming in the design of the product."' 9
The relevance of the distinction between an intended and an inadvertent design flaw is one of the most esoteric concepts that the
Reporters propose. The distinction obviously is intended to have farreaching ramifications, since an unintended design flaw is treated like
a manufacturing defect: no negligence need be proven, and no alternative, safer process need be shown. In the case of the intended design, however, the plaintiff, in order to recover, must show that the
defendant was negligent in failing to adopt a reasonable, alternative,
and safer design.

14. See 72nd Annual Meeting, 1996 A.L.I. PRoc. 198 (comments of Reporter Twerski on
May 17, 1995).
15. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995).
16. Id. § 3.
17. Id. § 3 cmt. b, at 128.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 129.
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As stated by Professor Henderson:
Inadvertent design errors are similar to manufacturing flaws in
several respects. For one thing, both design errors and flaws are
unintended. If the design errors or flaws were discovered, the manufacturer would presumably not market the particular products involved. Moreover, both manufacturing flaws and inadvertent
design errors tend to defeat the very purposes for which the products are produced and marketed. Just as a hairline flaw in a soda
bottle causes it to explode during intended use, rendering it useless
as a container as well as physically dangerous, so the inadvertent
design error of employing glass of insufficient thickness or strength
to withstand intended use produces the same unhappy result. And
inadvertent design errors share with manufacturing flaws the tendency to be hidden from the user or consumer. Finally, neither
flaws nor inadvertent design errors are amenable to being made20the
subject of effective warnings in the marketing of the products.
The fanciful distinction between intended and unintended design
flaws is hard to grasp under the best of circumstances. Should a manufacturer be held liable if it inadvertently designs a soda bottle with
"glass of insufficient thickness or strength to withstand intended use,"
but be relieved of liability if he intentionally chooses such glass? One
would think that not only would the manufacturer be liable for compensatory damages in the case of such an intentional choice, but for
21
punitive damages as well.
Suppose a manufacturer makes a product held together by six
screws, and then on an experimental basis begins making one fourth
of his products with only five screws. Assume that six screws are adequate, but that five are inadequate, to hold the product together. Assume further that production managers inadvertently increase the
five-screw line from one fourth to one third of total production. The
plaintiff is injured by a five-screw product that falls apart. Should it
make any difference whatsoever whether the injuring product was
part of the original experimental production, or part of the inadvertent increase?
The ludicrousness of the distinction between design and manufacturing flaws-whether advertent or inadvertent-is illustrated by
Paugh v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 22 The Paugh plaintiff alleged that
20. James A. Henderson, Jr., JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1548-49 (1973). The suggestion that inadvertent design defects occur only "occasionally" is belied by the variety of indavertent design
cases listed by Professor Henderson. See id. at 1550-51 nn.73-89, 1564 n.139.
21. See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 107-09 (6th Cir. 1975).
22. 834 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1993); see also Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 731 F.
Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1990).
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her husband died from smoking the defendant's cigarettes containing
pesticides. 23 The court dismissed the case because the plaintiff alleged
that all, rather than a random portion, of the defendant's products
contained pesticides. 24 The plaintiff was "essentially" claiming that
cigarettes generically are defective. 25 Under Ohio's tort "reform"
statute, the plaintiff could recover only if she showed that the defendant's allegedly defective product deviated in production from similar
26
units produced by the defendant.
Conceding that most of the time most people can tell the difference between a manufacturing and a design flaw based on regularity
of recurrence, 2 7 one must still confront the fundamental question of
whether the distinction makes any difference from a policy perspective. Given the policy reasons put forth by the Reporters for imposing
strict liability in the case of production defects, there is no justifiable
basis for the distinction. As the Reporters state in comment a to section 2 of the proposed Restatement (Third):
The rule for manufacturing defects stated in § 2(a) imposes liability whether or not the manufacturer's quality control efforts satisfy standards of reasonableness. Strict liability without fault in this
context is generally believed to foster several objectives. On the
premise that tort law serves the instrumental function of creating
safety initiatives, imposing strict liability on manufacturers for harm
caused by manufacturing defects is thought to encourage greater investment in product safety than does a regime of fault-based liability under which, as a practical matter, sellers may escape their
appropriate share of responsibility. Some courts and commentators
also have said that strict liability discourages the consumption of
defective products by causing the purchase prices of products to reflect, more than would a rule of negligence, the costs of defects.
And by eliminating the issue of manufacturer fault from plaintiff's
case, strict liability is thought to reduce the transaction costs involved in litigating that issue.
Several important fairness concerns are also believed to support manufacturer's liability for manufacturing defects even if the
plaintiff is unable to show that the manufacturer's quality control
fails to meet risk-utility norms. In some cases manufacturing defects are in fact caused by manufacturer negligence but plaintiff's
will have difficulty proving it. Strict liability therefore performs a
function similar to the concept of res ipsa loquitur, allowing deserv23. See Paugh, 834 F. Supp. at 232.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 230.

26. See id.
27. But an exception to the rule may undermine the rule itself. Thus, for example, the
unexplainable antinomy may undermine one's faith in the ultimate triumph of logic. See Jerry J.
Phillips, Law as Ornamentation,10 T.M. CooLEY L. REv. 499, 507-09 (1993).
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ing plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what would otherwise be
difficult or insuperable problems of proof. Flawed products are also
said to disappoint reasonable expectations as to product performance. Because manufacturers invest in quality control at consciously chosen levels, their knowledge that a predictable number of
flawed products will enter the marketplace entails an element of
deliberation about the amount of injury that will result from their
activity. Finally, many believe that consumers who benefit from
products without suffering harm should share, through increases in
prices charged for those products, the burden of unavoidable injury
costs that result from manufacturing defects.
An often-cited rationale for holding wholesalers and retailers
strictly liable for harm caused by manufacturing defects is that, as
between them and innocent victims who suffer harm because of defective products, the product sellers as business entities are in a better position than are individual users and consumers to insure
against such losses. In most instances, wholesalers and retailers will
be able to pass liability costs up the chain of product distribution to
the manufacturer. When joining the manufacturer in the tort action
presents the plaintiff with procedural difficulties, local retailers can
pay damages to the victims and then seek indemnity from manufacturers. Finally, holding retailers and wholesalers strictly liable creates incentives for them to deal only with reputable, financially
responsible manufacturers and distributors, thereby helping to protect the interests of users and consumers. 28
If one changes the phrase "manufacturing defects" to "design defects"
in this comment, the policy rationales apply with equal force to design
defects.
In the 1918 North Carolina case of Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola
Bottling Co., the plaintiff was injured by an exploding bottle. 29 The
defendant bottler offered proof that it followed the industry's bottle
production standard. 30 This proof was considered irrelevant by the
judge, particularly because the standard could be characterized as
"reckless," or unmindful of possible precautions such as the use of
wicker coverings or thicker bottles. 31 "'Safety first' for the public,"
the court said, and continued:
[I]f these goods are so inherently dangerous from their frequent explosion and liability to cause damage, as by putting out the eye of
the plaintiff, that they cannot be made safe, then placing them upon
the market is indictable [and] makes the manufacturers
and all ven32
dors liable to actions for any damage accruing.
28. RESTATEMENT (TmImD) OF TORTs: PRODuCT LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a, at 13-14 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
29. 97 S.E. 27, 27 (N.C. 1918).
30. See id. at 28.
31. See id. at 28-29. Today plastic containers might be required.
32. Id. at 29 (citing Ward v. Sea Food Co., 87 S.E. 958, 958 (N.C. 1916)).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:129

The court did not concern itself with whether the defect was one of
manufacture or of design. It was not concerned with whether the defendant's conduct was reckless or inadvertent. What was essential to
the court was whether the incident was "of a kind that ordinarily
would occur only as a result of [a] product defect. ' 33 The court specifically held that the availability of a safer product was immaterial. 34
The central consideration was that the product was "inherently dangerous, ' 35 or unreasonably unsafe as we would say today. One may
call it a generic defect, a category defect, or whatever one chooses.
The product, however described, was defective. 36
B. Failure-to-Warn
Many people decry the excessive use of warning claims in products liability. Professor Carl Bogus has persuasively argued that failure to warn has been used, for example, in asbestos litigation as a
guise for generic defect claims, where liability is based on risk outweighing utility, without more. 37 Whatever the problems associated
with products claims based on failure-to-warn-in terms of proof of
causation and so forth-it is fair to say that warning liability is here to
stay. These claims are not limited to the situation where the product
is properly designed but contains a latent danger, such as in the case
of poisons. Warning claims are also commonly asserted in tandem
with a design defect claim.
Indeed, warning claims have much in common with design claims;
much like manufacturing-design claims, warning-design claims occasionally overlap. A backup signal on heavy equipment, for example,
serves as a warning although it requires a design or engineering alteration of the product to be implemented. 38 Warnings are supposed to
enable the consumer to decide whether or how to use a product, while
design changes are supposed to avert the danger altogether without
33. See RESTATEMENT (T~roD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 3(a) (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 1996).

34. See Grant,97 S.E. at 28-29.
35. Id. at 29.
36. Professors Henderson and Twerski, Reporters for the proposed Restatement (Third),
seem to think terminology in this regard is very important. See James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability
Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1298 (1991). The essential question, however, is
whether a product is unacceptable, and unacceptability is defined in a variety of ways for purposes of product liability.
37. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products
Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 38-46 (1995).
38. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Wagner Mining Equip. Co., 667 F.2d 402, 404 (3d Cir. 1981); Pike
v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 237 (Cal. 1970).
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the intervention of the consumer's will. This distinction, however, is
misleading, since many safety guards are design devices that require
the consumer's choice in use of the device. Conversely, a warning
may be so strong (e.g., a rat poison that induces vomiting in humans as
a cathartic if ingested) as to approach a design change which bars access to dangerous exposure.
As with manufacturing and design defects, most people probably
think they can distinguish between design and warning claims in general. Because of the interrelation of design and warning defects, however, and because such claims are often brought in tandem, it is useful
to compare them.
Warning claims typically do not require expert testimony to establish a warning's necessity, a warning's inefficacy, or an injury's causation, while expert testimony is usually required to establish design
defectiveness. More important for purposes of this analysis, in the
case of warning claims, courts typically do not require the plaintiff to
introduce evidence as to the language of a better warning. The plaintiff must only show that no warning was given and that one was
needed, or that the warning given was inadequate; the jury can then
infer that a better warning would have averted the plaintiff's harm
without evidence as to exactly what would be a better warning.
The alternative-warning issue is well presented in Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Products, Co., where a fifteen-month-old child
aspirated the defendant's baby oil, which caused severe brain and locomotor damage. 39 The child's mother testified that had she been
warned of this grave danger, she would have kept the baby oil out of
the child's reach.40 She offered no evidence, however, as to the language of such a warning:
Johnson & Johnson contends that the Ayerses were required to
prove the exact wording of a warning they allege would have been
adequate to prevent the injury. This argument is based upon RCW
7.72.030(1)(b), which requires the trier of fact in a failure to warn
case to consider whether "the manufacturer could have provided
the warnings or instructions which the claimant alleges would have
been adequate." Johnson & Johnson argues that this statute requires a claimant in warnings cases to put before the jury "warnings
or instructions which the claimant alleges would have been adequate." Johnson & Johnson reasons that a jury cannot decide that a
warning would have prevented an accident without knowing exactly
what that warning is ....
39. 818 P.2d 1337, 1339 (1991).
40. See id. at 1340-41.
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We reject Johnson & Johnson's argument and hold that the language of RCW 7.72.030(1)(b) does not require a claimant to establish the exact wording of the alternative warning. The statute's
requirement that "the manufacturer could have provided the warnings or instructions which the claimant alleges would have been adequate" is satisfied if the claimant specifies the substance of the
warning. Here, the Ayerses contend that had they been warned of
the dangers of aspirating baby oil, the accident would have been
avoided. This suffices to indicate the nature of the warning the
Ayerses allege Johnson & Johnson should have provided and therefore satisfies the requirement of RCW 7.72.030(1)(b). Moreover,
requiring claimants in failure to warn cases to establish the exact
wording of an alternative warning would impose too onerous a burden. The members of the jury might agree that a certain type of
warning should have been provided, but they might not agree
among themselves
as to exactly how that warning should have been
4
worded . 1
This aspect of Ayers closely parallels the theory of generic design
claims. In these claims the plaintiff shows that the product was more
dangerous than useful, without having to show in detail how the product could have acceptably been made less dangerous. Indeed, the
members of the jury "might not agree among themselves" as to exactly how the product could have been made less dangerous: 42 some
may think by alternative design, some by a substitute product, some
by warning, and others, as the court suggested in Chero-Cola,43 by

removal of the product from the market altogether.
Professor Bogus' astute observation that warning claims may
sometimes serve as a guise for what are in reality generic defect claims
can be viewed favorably rather than negatively.4a In a generic defect
case the jury, in finding for the plaintiff, is deciding that a product
does not meet ordinary consumer expectations. A major part of those
expectations is determined by product appearance, getup, presentation and marketing, as well as by customary standards of acceptability. 45 What a product "says" to the ordinary consumer is intimately
connected with statements-as well as the absence of statements or
warnings-associated with the product.
Another close similarity between design and warning claims is
that courts frequently couch both in negligence rather than in strict
41. Id. at 1341-42.
42. Id. at 1342.

43. Grant v. Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 97 S.E. 27, 29 (N.C. 1918).
44. See Bogus, supra note 37, at 44-46.
45. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., infra note 147 and accompanying text; see also Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
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liability terms. Using the date of manufacture as the benchmark for
determining design defectiveness, courts often say that the issue is
whether the product could properly have been designed more safely.
If so, then the product should have been, and the manufacturer's failure to do so implies the absence of due care on its behalf.
Courts are probably more prone to frame warning claims, as compared to design claims, in terms of negligence because courts have
difficulty conceptualizing a duty to warn about the unknown. This
conceptual block involves a misunderstanding of the nature of strict
liability, which assumes the possibility of infeasibility and eliminates
this consideration as an issue from the case for policy and procedural
46

reasons.

Courts widely impose strict liability for manufacturing defects,4 7
whose similarity to design defects has already been considered.
48
Courts also widely impose strict liability for misrepresentation,
which permeates the law of products liability. 49 The pressure toward
strict liability exerted by manufacturing-defect and misrepresentation
claims on design and warning claims may eventually enable the courts
to understand and accept strict liability in assessing warning and design claims.
C. Misrepresentation
The Reporters, many courts, and some commentators persist in
asserting that products defects are of three kinds: manufacturing, design, and warning inadequacies.5 0 Why this assertion is made is unclear, except perhaps from habit or a tendency to imitate. Clearly,
however, a fourth and very significant category of product defectiveness arises from misrepresentation.
Misrepresentation is the mirror image of failure-to-warn. Both
are based on inadequate written or oral communications and both
may require some degree of reliance by the consumer or another in
the chain of distribution.51 They curiously diverge, however, because
46. See Beshada v. Johns-Manvill Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 544-45 (N.J. 1982).

47. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
48. See e.g., Huebert v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 494 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1972).

49. See generally Marshall S. Shapo, A RepresentationalTheory of Consumer Protection,60
VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974).
50. See RESTATEMENT (T~mRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 & § 1 Reporters' Note,
at 7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
51. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 567-68 (3d Cir. 1990); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B cint. j (1965); U.C.C. § 2-313, crts. 3 & 7, at 99, 100; Special Project,
Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions:An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1183

(1987).
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misrepresentation is widely viewed as the basis for a strict liability
cause of action (although fault may also be alleged, if present, as an
alternative basis of recovery), while a warning failure is widely described as exclusively fault-based. Why should this be? In what ways
do the two differ so as to make such a major difference?
Warning defects generally involve a failure to communicate, or to
communicate adequately, while misrepresentation involves an affirmative misstatement. The distinction more or less parallels that between errors of omission and of commission. There is, however, no
such bright-line distinction. Similar to misrepresentations, inadequate
warnings (as opposed to total failure-to-warn) involve an affirmative
communication that is incomplete. Hauter v. Zogarts provides a good
example of the symbiotic relationship between warning and misrepresentation. 52 The Hauter defendant marketed a very dangerous "Golf53
ing Gizmo," designed to aid the user in learning to play golf.
Plaintiff successfully asserted claims for breach of express warranty
and innocent tortious misrepresentation based on the defendant's promotional representation: "COMPLETELY SAFE BALL WILL NOT
HIT PLAYER. ' 54 In fact, if the player failed to hit the ball squarely,
as the plaintiff did, the club could become entangled in the elastic
"Gizmo" and the attached golf ball could strike the player in the head
with a disastrous bolo effect. 55 The misrepresentation in Hauter consisted of an affirmative misstatement, but it was also an inadequate
statement since it failed to warn of the bolo-effect risk. One could say
that the statement overstated the product's safety, but conversely one
could just as well say it understated the risk.
There are numerous warnings cases where the defendant gives an
affirmative, yet inadequate, warning. The inadequacy may result, for
example, from failure to warn of potentially grave consequences of
not heeding the warning, or for failing to warn of available antidotes
or remedies if the warning is inadvertently ignored. The inadequate
warning can be viewed as either an understatement of the risk or an
overstatement of safety.
Thus, in Boyl v. California Chem. Co. the plaintiff was warned
that defendant's weed killer was highly toxic and that she should
"wash thoroughly and destroy" the weed killer container after it was
52.
53.
54.
55.

534 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1975).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 381.
See id. at 379-80.
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empty.5 6 She followed the warning, emptying the contents of the
rinsed container onto the rough grass in her back yard. 57 Five days
later, while sunbathing in the area where she had poured the rinse
water, she was badly burned from the residue of the weed killer still
on the ground. 58 The warning was inadequate because it failed to
warn "of the stable quality and long-lasting contamination propensities of the sodium arsenite" contained in the weed killer.59 The warning also impliedly overstated the safety of the direction to "wash
thoroughly and destroy" the container after completion of use.60
The interrelation of product misrepresentation and failure-towarn parallels that of negligent misrepresentation and nondisclosure
in tort law generally. The Restatement (Second)'s section 552 describes a negligent misrepresentation as the supply of false information.61 Negligent nondisclosure is described in section 551(2)(b) as the
failure to disclose matters necessary to prevent a "partial or ambiguous statement" from being misleading. 62 The "uttering of a half truth"
is a hybrid of misrepresentation and nondisclosure. 63 Similarly, the
inadequate product warning is a hybrid of misrepresentation, and vice
versa.
Not only do product warning and misrepresentation claims overlap, but misrepresentation claims often overlap and undergird design
claims as well. A claim for product misrepresentation often accompanies a claim for inadequate design.64 A misrepresentation may
counteract a warning. 65 Also, a misrepresentation may support a finding of foreseeable use. 66 An express misrepresentation overlaps with
the implied warranty of merchantability, as for example in section 2314(2)(f) of the Uniform Commercial Code which provides that to be
merchantable goods must "conform to the promises or affirmations of
56. 221 F.Supp. 669, 672 (D. Or. 1963) (emphasis omitted).

57. See id. at 673.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 672. Arguably this statement was merely an instruction: "Directions and warnings
are intended to serve different purposes. The former are designed to assure an effective use of
the product; a warning, on the other hand, is intended to assure a safe use." McCully v. Fuller
Brush Co., 415 P.2d 7, 10 (Wash. 1966).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1965).

62.
63.
64.
N.W.2d
65.
66.

Id. § 551(2)(b).
Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1942).
See Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1975); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154
488, 491 (Minn. 1967).
See Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 41 A.2d 850, 851-52 (Pa. 1945).
See Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 671 P.2d 369, 373-74 (Alaska 1983).
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fact made on the container or label if any."' 67 Indeed, as Justice Traynor pointed out in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., there is an
implicit representation of safety from the mere presence of goods on
the market. 68
D.

The Implications of Product Defect Overlap

The implications of product defect overlap are far-reaching. For
one thing, the overlap indicates that proof of a product design defect
cannot be neatly pigeon-holed so as to require proof of a "reasonable
alternative design," as the Reporters would have it.69 The earlier dis-

cussion shows that, for proof of design defect, the section 2 alternative-design requirement and the section 3 ordinary-occurrence
requirement of the proposed Restatement (Third) similarly cannot be
70
neatly pigeon-holed.
The design strictures of section 2 run afoul of negligence and implied warranty concepts. They do not take account of the widespread
acknowledgment of risk-utility as a basis for defective design recovery, where an alternative design may be a relevant but not an essential
element of proof. The strictures also greatly underplay the importance of consumer expectations for product defectiveness, including
defective design. In section 6 the Reporters, contrary to developing
law, would essentially eliminate design liability for prescription drugs
71
and medical devices.
Finally, and probably most disturbing, the proposed Restatement
(Third) constitutes a major retreat from strict products liability, which
has been the hallmark of the celebrated Restatement (Second) section
402A. The Reporters cannot validly claim that this retreat represents
the majority view in this country today. Nor can they effectively claim
that it represents the better view. Their position may be that strict
liability is not practically workable, but the facts do not bear out this
position. Strict liability is probably not well understood by courts, juries, and lawyers. But if it is a good and workable basis of recovery
for unsafe products that cause injury-as history and reflection indi67.
68.
69.
1995).
70.
71.

1995).

U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(f.
377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
RESTATEMENT (TiRnD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
See supra part I.A.
See REsTATEMENT (THmD) oF TORTS: PRODUCTS IJAB11rrY § 6 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
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cate it is-then the role of the American Law Institute should be to
improve, not abandon, the concept of strict products liability.
II.

NEGLIGENCE

Professor Oscar Gray was probably the first person to recognize
the baleful implications of the alternative-safer-design formula of the
proposed section 2(b) of Restatement (Third) as virtually the sole basis
of recovery for defective product design. 72 Under this rigid formula,
he pointed out, without a "reasonable alternative design," product
manufacturers would be able to negligently market products with impunity. 73 Such a twist of interpretation under section 2(b) would constitute a major and far-reaching departure from long-accepted
principles of negligence law in this country. Typically the negligence
plaintiff only has to prove that the defendant acted without due care,
and that such conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.
A products liability case illustrating this principle is McKee v.
Brunswick Corp.74 There the plaintiffs were injured when their boat,
which was manufactured and sold by the defendants, caught fire and
exploded. The plaintiffs recovered by showing that the accident occurred because of defective ignition coils, which had been negligently
installed "without testing or with inadequate testing. '75 While the
proof also indicated negligence in failing to install fuses in the ignition
system (an arguably safer alternative design), this proof was not essential to the case. 76 The principal proof was failure to adequately test. 77
The Reporters recognize negligent conduct as a sufficient basis of
recovery in the proposed Restatement (Third) in a least two instances:
(1) when there is a statutory violation, 78 and (2) when a nonmanufacturing seller of a prescription drug or medical device "fails to exercise
79
reasonable care" in the sale or distribution of the drug or device.
Concerned with the continued viability of a negligence cause of
action without proof of a defect within the meaning of section 2,
Councilman John P. Frank and Adviser Robert E. Keeton introduced
72. See Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALl Product Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachronism? 61 TENN.L. REV. 1105, 1109-13 (1994).
73. Id. at 1105.
74. 354 F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 1965).

75. Id. at 582.
76. See id. at 582-83.
77. See id.
78. See RESTATEMENT (THmRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILrry § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995).

79. Id. § 8(e)(2).
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at the annual meeting of the American Law Institute in May 1995 the
following amendment to comment m of section 2, which the membership passed:
Product-related claims not based on defects at time of sale or distribution are beyond the scope of this Section and § 1. This Restatement covers several such topics, including liability based on
misrepresentation (see § 16) and post-sale breach of duty (see
§§ 17, 18 and 19). Claims based on allegations of negligent marketing of nondefective products are addressed by provisions of the Restatement of Torts, Second. See, e.g., § 291 (negligence generally)
and § 390 (negligent entrustment of products to incompetent
persons).80
This comment may well not accomplish its purpose, however, because of the statements that only products claims "not based on defects
at time of sale or distribution" and claims based on "negligent marketing of nondefective products" are beyond the scope of sections 1 and 2
of the proposed Restatement (Third).
For examples of claims "not based on defects at the time of sale
or distribution," the proponents of the amendment cite sections 16-19
of the proposed Restatement (Third). Section 16 involves misrepresentation, a basis of recovery where the only necessary defective condition is the misrepresentation itself.8 ' Sections 17 and 18 deal with
post-sale duties to warn and recall, s2 respectively, where a defective
condition of manufacture, warning or design (and perhaps also of misrepresentation)-either existing at the time of sale or arising postsale 3-is a predicate to recovery. Section 19 deals with successor corporation liability, which is predicated on the existence of a defect in a
product when it is sold by the predecessor corporation. 84 Thus, with
the exception of section 16, which is based on misrepresentation and is
sui generis, the cited sections deal with liability based on proof of defect. If that alleged defect is one of design, for example, then presumably the proof requirements of section 2(b) must be met, the hortatory
80. 72nd Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 215-16 (comments of President Wright).
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTs LiAaaLrry § 16 (Preliminary Draft
No. 3, 1995).
82. Section 18 imposes liability for failure to recall or repair a product "only when a duty to
recall or repair is required by statute or regulation." See id. § 18. This is a restriction of existing
law, where a common law duty to recall or repair may be imposed. See Balido v. Improved
Mach., Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 900-01 (Ct. App. 1972); Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
723 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1983).
83. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 17 cmt. b, Reporters'

Note at 58-59 & § 17 cmt. b, illus. 1-3, Reporters' Note at 59-62 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1995).
84. See id. § 19.
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statement of the first sentence of the amendment-"not based on defects"-notwithstanding.
The critical portion, however, is the last part of the amendment
which deals with "negligence" and "negligent entrustment"-sections
291 and 390, respectively, of the Restatement (Second).85 The amendment unequivocally states that these sections deal with the "negligent
marketing of nondefective products. ' 86 If the product is putatively defective, then the plaintiff may be put to her proof under section 2,
regardless of whether negligent marketing or entrustment is alleged.87
Negligent entrustment often involves nondefective products that
are carelessly placed in the hands of an incompetent or ill-informed
person. But negligent entrustment may also involve defective products. Let us assume, for example, that cigarettes are considered defective or unreasonably dangerous. One who sues another for
negligently entrusting this product in the hands of a minor might be
put to her proof of showing that the product was defective, and absent
such proof the claim might fail.
Similarly, negligent marketing in general may or may not involve
a defective product. In McKee v. Brunswick Corp., the ignition coil
may have been negligently designed or manufactured. 88 Would the
plaintiff in such a case be put to the burden of showing that there was
no design defect or manufacturing flaw before she could recover for
''negligence generally"?
The proponents of the amendment contemplated that the plaintiff
could elect to prove only negligence, thus sidestepping section 2. Unfortunately, the amendment does not clearly support such a power of
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291, 390 (1965).

86. 72nd Annual Meeting,supra note 14, 215-16 (comments of President Wright) (emphasis
added).
87. A similar problem may exist under § 3 of the proposed Restatement (Third). In order to

recover under that section the harm must be the result of an incident "of a kind that ordinarily
would occur only as a result of product defect." RESTATEMENT (T-nnD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABIT=Y § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, the plaintiff may be required to prove both product defect within the meaning of section 2 and ordinariness of the

incident in order to recover under section 3.
Comment b to section 3 states that it is "not necessary for the plaintiff to prove with precision" whether the accident was caused by a manufacturing or a design defect, and that the plain-

tiff "need not specify the type of defect responsible for the product malfunction." Id. § 3 cmt. b,
at 128-29. But the illustrations to this comment, e.g., 1 and 6, indicate that the plaintiff will be

required to show with precision the defects that may have existed, and will only be relieved of
the burden of showing which defect was the precise cause where one of several defects may have
existed. See id.
§ 3 cmt. b, illus. 1, 6,at 129-30, 131. Thus, section 3 may not lighten the section 2
burden, just as the amendment to comment m of section 2 may not lighten the section 2 burden
either.
88. 354 F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 1975).
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election, since its effect is triggered only when the claim is "not based
on defects at time of sale or distribution," or when it is based on the
"negligent marketing of nondefective products."8 9
The potential trap of this comment is illustrated by the abnormal
danger case of Indiana HarborBelt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co.90
There the plaintiff recovered in strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity against the manufacturer and shipper of a flammable toxic
liquid that leaked from a railway tank car, causing the plaintiff railroad to incur extensive cleanup costs. 91 The court of appeals, per
Judge Posner, reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of
negligence, because the court found that negligence on the part of the
defendant was likely present in the maintenance of the tank car.92
Courts and the Restatement (Second) recognize that strict liability for
an abnormally dangerous activity can apply even though negligence is
or may be present. 93 But Judge Posner rejected this position. If the
case has elements of negligence, he would put the plaintiff to her
proof on the issue even though she might ultimately fail to establish
94
negligence and thus lose the case.
89. 72nd Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 215-16 (comments of President Wright).
90. 517 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. I1. 1981).
91. See id. at 315.
92. See Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (7th
Cir. 1990). Judge Posner also made a risk-utility analysis of the classical economic variety:
The district judge and the plaintiffs lawyer make much of the fact that the spill
occurred in a densely inhabited metropolitan area. Only 4,000 gallons spilled; what if
all 20,000 had done so? Isn't the risk that this might happen even if everybody were
careful sufficient to warrant giving the shipper an incentive to explore alternative
routes? Strict liability would supply that incentive. But this argument overlooks the
fact that, like other transportation networks, the railroad network is a hub-and-spoke
system. And the hubs are in metropolitan areas. Chicago is one of the nation's largest
railroad hubs. In 1983, the latest year for which we have figures, Chicago's railroad
yards handled the third highest volume of hazardous-material shipments in the nation.
It is no more realistic to propose to reroute the shipment of all hazardous materials
around Chicago than it is to propose the relocation of homes adjacent to the Blue
Island switching yard to more distant suburbs. It may be less realistic. Brutal though it
may seem to say it, the inappropriate use to which land is being put in the Blue Island
yard and neighborhood may be, not the transportation of hazardous chemicals, but
residential living.
Id. at 1180-81. Judge Posner jumps to the conclusion that liability would require relocation of
the railyard, rather than using the traditional economic analysis that a manufacturer-shipper (not
the railyard) should pay the costs of unreasonable dangers created by its activities. Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas is a maxim of fairness that is apparently inapplicable to economic analysis.
93. See, e.g., Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska
1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520 cimt. f, at 37-38 (1977).
94. Compare Posner's position to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, where some courts say if
the plaintiff introduces specific acts of negligence, then the doctrine does not apply. See. e.g.,
Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978). By analogy, here if the evidence supports an inference of a section 2 defect, then the amendment to comment m may not
apply.
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Similarly, a Posner-type of court might put the plaintiff to proof
of defect under section 2 if the case includes a possible defect, even
though the plaintiff alleged negligence as the basis of her claim. This
result is particularly likely in view of the "not-based-on-defects" and
"nondefective" language of the amendment to comment m of section
2.95 If the plaintiff failed to prove a section 2 defect, she would lose
even though evidence of negligence preponderated.
For products liability cases, the importance of preserving a negligence claim without the necessity of proving a defect-particularly defective design-is apparent not only for the reasons presented by
Professor Gray.96 Negligence uses a risk-utility balancing test
presented in terms of fault which a jury is especially well-equipped to
assess. Moreover, negligence is the basis of liability for the vast range
of tort law, and products liability should not be treated differently
from tort law in general when fault is present.
Negligence uses a generic risk-based approach to product defectiveness which may well be the most suitable analysis for products liability in general. That is, the jury decides that had the defendant acted
with care, it would probably never have marketed the product in such
a dangerous condition. If the defendant acts negligently, it should pay
the cost of injuries resulting from its negligence. Those costs may result in a rise of price for the product, thus making the product noncompetitive with similar or substitute products. That is how the
marketplace works and how it should work.
Negligence law has been a crucible for the development of common law. That crucible should not be destroyed in the important area
of products liability. The hallmark of negligence law is a balancing of
risk against utility. If fault is removed as a critical factor of that test,
then the inquiry becomes the essence of much of modern products
liability law.

III.

THE RISK-UTILiTY TEST

The other major body of strict tort law in America, liability for
abnormally dangerous activities, uses a risk-utility test to determine
95. 72nd Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 215-16. Interestingly, the "nondefective" term
is deleted from this comment as set forth in RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cnt. n, at 78-79 (Proposed Final Draft (Preliminary Version), 1995), but apparently
with no intended change of meaning.
96. See supra note 72.
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liability. 97 So does the law of nuisance, which, when applied on a

strict liability basis, tracks strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. 98 Strict products liability, as originally articulated by Dean
Wade and as adopted by many courts, also uses a risk-utility test for
determining liability.99
The Reporters for the proposed Restatement (Third) purport to
use a risk-utility test in determining products liability for warning and
design defects. 1°° The warning standard is one of straight negligence. 10 ' The design standard of that section is one of manufacturer
negligence, with the additional twist that the plaintiff must prove a
"reasonable alternative design" in order to recover. 0 2 This requirement of a "reasonable alternative design" imposes an especially onerous burden on the plaintiff, a burden that she may often be unable to
meet. The requirement is probably the single-most controversial provision of the proposed Restatement (Third). The central issue is
whether it is fair to place this burden on the plaintiff in product design
litigation.
The Reporters insist in comment e to section 2 that the alternative design requirement is not intended to place an onerous burden on
the plaintiff:
[S]ection 2(b) does not require the plaintiff actually to produce a
prototype in order to make out a prima facie case.... [Tihe plaintiff
is not required to establish in detail the costs and benefits associated
with adoption of the suggested alternative design.... For justice to
be achieved, § 2(b) should not be construed
to create artificial and
3
unreasonable barriers to recovery. 10
If the plaintiff is not required under section 2(b) to produce a
prototype of an alternative design, then it is unclear what type of
proof of an alternative design she is required to produce. If the plaintiff is not required to establish "in detail" the costs and benefits of the
alternative design, as against the challenged design, then it is unclear
what type of evidence of such costs and benefits she is required to
97. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs §§ 519-20 (1977); In re 101 California St. Bldg.,
No. 959316 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1995) (negligence and abnormal danger strict liability
claims stated against manufacturer of assault weapon used in law office mass killing).
98. See Liber v. Flor, 415 P.2d 332, 338 (Colo. 1966).
99. See Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (Or. 1974) (citing Dean Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturing., 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Dean Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilities for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973)).
100. See RESTATEMENT (TmnuD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt c, at 19-21 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
101. See id. § 2(c).
102. See id. § 2(b).
103. Id. § 2, cmt. e, at 25.
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produce. It is unclear when a barrier to recovery under section 2(b)
will be considered "artificial and unreasonable," and when it will not.
Richards v. Michelin Tire Co. provides an example of how onerous the proof of alternative design can be.1°4 The Richards court
found that the plaintiff failed to present proof of a safer tire bead design, even though he presented evidence that other manufacturers had
produced a stronger bead that would have prevented a tire explosion
in a mismatched mounting of the sort involved in the case. 0 5 The
plaintiff failed, the court wrote, to show "that a tire utilizing a stronger
bead wire that can better withstand overinflation when mismatched is
06
of greater overall safety than the Michelin tire in question.'
The Reporters state in their Notes to section 2 of the proposed
Restatement (Third): "Very substantial authority supports the proposition that plaintiff must establish a reasonable alternative design in order for a product to be adjudged defective in design.' 07 Professor
Howard Klemme's preliminary research indicates that this statement
is not correct. 08 Thorough analyses of the case law in articles by Professor Frank Vandall and by Attorney John Vargo confirm Professor
Klemme's findings. 0 9
The courts tend to use a risk-benefit analysis without requiring
proof of an alternative design. Such proof is permissible, by either
side, but not required. 1 0 Consumer expectations considerations
blend into this analysis."'
A good example of risk-benefit analysis is LaGorga v. Kroger
Co.,112 where the plaintiff, a small child, was severely burned when his
cotton fabric jacket was exposed to a spark from a metal trash barrel.
The jacket burned rapidly, and the fire could virtually not be extin104. 21 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 1994).
105. See id. at 1056-57.

106. Id. at 1056 (emphasis added). See also Reporter Henderson's sharp criticism of the
plaintiff's design evidence based on "theoretical alternatives." Henderson, supra note 20 at
1568-71.
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. c, Reporters' Note, at
50 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
108. See Howard C. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the Consultative Group, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1173 (1994).
109. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b):
The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407 (1994); John F. Vargo,
The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section
402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Reveals a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493 (1996).
110. See, e.g., Vandall, supra note 109, at 1410, 1411, 1412, 1413-18.
111. See, e.g., Vargo, supra note 109, at 944, 945, 947.
112. 275 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
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guished." 3 While there was "evidence that 80%-90% of cotton fabric
is treated with flame retardant substances, but the cotton outer shell
of this jacket was not so treated," there is no indication that this evidence was critical to sustaining the plaintiff's verdict. 114 The court
said: "We think it is no answer to say that the burning characteristics
of [plaintiff's] jacket were generic to all other jackets made for children by various sellers. ... It is established in Pennsylvania that a
manufacturer has a duty to make a product 'safe for ordinary, foreseeable circumstances.' ",115
Hauter v. Zogarts,considered previously, is another such risk-utility suit. 11 6 Although the case was primarily tried on a misrepresenta-

tion claim, the court also found that defendant's "Golfing Gizmo" was
not reasonably safe under a strict liability analysis.'1 7 "At trial, plaintiff demonstrated how a person using the Gizmo under normal conditions is likely to injure himself by entangling his club in the cord
attached to the ball, a significant danger not inherent in the game of
golf." 18 There was no discussion as to whether the golf-training device involved in the case could have been made safer by a reasonable
alternative design. The product was simply defective because it was
unreasonably dangerous for its intended or foreseeable use.
The Reporters provide a very small window for pure risk-benefit
analysis of design defectiveness in comment d to section 2:
d. Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonabledesign.

Several courts have suggested that the designs of some products are
so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low social utility and
high degree of danger, that liability should attach even absent proof
of a reasonable alternative design. In large part the problem is one
of how the range of relevant alternative designs is described. For
example, a toy gun that shoots hard rubber pellets with sufficient
velocity to cause injury to children could be found to be defectively
designed within the rule of § 2(b). Toy guns that do not produce
injury would constitute reasonable alternatives to the dangerous
toy. Thus, toy guns that project ping pong balls, soft gelatin pellets,
or water might be found to be reasonable alternative designs to a
toy gun that shoots hard pellets. However, if consideration is limited to toy guns that are capable of causing injury, then no reasonable alternative will, by hypothesis, be available. In that instance,
113. See id.
114. Id. at 379.

115.
1966)).
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 378-79 (quoting Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558, 560 (3d Cir.
534 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1975).
See id. at 387-88.
Id. at 387.
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the design feature that defines which alternatives are relevant-the
capacity to injure-is precisely the feature on which the user places
value and of which the plaintiff complains. If a court were to adopt
this characterization of the product, it could conclude that liability
should attach without proof of a reasonable alternative design. The
court would condemn the product design as defective and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of danger posed by
its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible utility that no rational adult, fully aware of the relevant facts, would

choose to use or consume the product. 119

The comment is restricted to products with an "extremely high
degree of danger" and with "negligible utility."'1 20 The only example
given is a "toy gun that shoots hard rubber pellets with sufficient velocity to cause injury to children."' 121 Such a toy gun is hardly a mainline product. Even so, the Reporters suggest reasonable alternative
designs for this product, namely, "guns that project ping pong balls,
soft gelatin pellets, or water.' 22 The Reporters are not content to
leave even such a dangerous product with negligible utility to a simple
risk-benefit analysis.
Comment d does not represent the way in which the risk-utility
test is actually applied by the courts. The test is applied to mainline
products, with the issue being whether risk or utility preponderatesnot whether the risk greatly outweighs the benefit. A good example
of the proper application of the risk-benefit test is found in Bowman
v. General Motors Corp.'2 3 The plaintiff claimed that the gasoline
tank on defendant's Toronado automobile was unreasonably
designed, exposing the operator to burn injuries in the event of a rearend collision.' 24 In sustaining the plaintiff's verdict, the court rejected
Reporter Henderson's conclusion that the determination of concious
design defectiveness is beyond the scope of juries. 125
The jury was instructed in arriving at its verdict to consider the
likelihood and seriousness of potential injury, the ability of the manufacturer "to eliminate any unsafe characteristics" of the vehicle "without impairing the usefulness or significantly increasing its cost," and to
"consider whether the vehicle was dangerous to an extent beyond that
119. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. d, at 21-22 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
120. Id. at 22.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
124. See id. at 235.
125. See id. at 241-42.
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which would be contemplated or expected by the ordinary user."'1 26
The court instructed the jury that in applying these factors it could
find:
Some cut one way-toward unreasonable danger-and some the
other-awayfrom that conclusion. It is for you, the jury, to evaluate
them in light of the facts as you find them in the case, and to determine where the correct balance lies. You may of course find there to
be other factors which appear from the evidence to shed light on
whether the Toronado's
design was defective, and if so you may
12 7
consider them.
The court recognized the similarity between negligence and strict
products liability for purposes of determining risk-utility. But, the
court said:
We believe.., that our charge is not a negligence charge which
focuses upon fault, but a products liability charge which focuses on
the product. We concede that the ratiodecidendi of a case thus submitted to the jury may be similar to that of the same case submitted
on negligence theory, and that it may be forcefully argued that some
of the ingredients in the balancing formula are akin to considerations involved in negligence cases. On the other hand, let us posit a
conscious design choice § 402A case where the manufacturer: (1)
after exhaustive study and testing has adopted a given design which
is slightly less safe than an alternative design but one which has
slightly greater utility and can be sold at a slightly lower price; and
(2) after considering the countervailing societal values has concluded that the public, in inflationary times, is concerned about
"saving a dollar" and about a more useful product, and would prefer the slightly less safe product in return for the price and utility
advantage. In a products liability lawsuit brought by someone injured by the product we believe it appropriatefor a jury to apply the
unreasonably dangerous risk-utility balancing formula which we
128
have explicated to determine the presence or absence of liability.
The Reporters' concern with imposing product design liability
generally on the basis of a risk-utility analysis, without requiring the
plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative design, is stated in comment
c to section 2:
The requirement in § 2(b) that plaintiff show a reasonable alternative design applies even though the plaintiff alleges that the
category of product sold by the defendant is so dangerous that it
should not have been marketed at all. Thus common and widely
distributed products such as alcoholic beverages, tobacco, firearms,
and above-ground swimming pools may be found to be defective
only upon proof of the requisite conditions in § 2(a), § 2(b), or
126. Id. at 244-45.

127. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
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§ 2(c). If such products are defectively manufactured or sold without reasonable warnings as to their danger when such warnings are
appropriate, or if reasonable alternative designs could have been
adopted, then liability under §§ 1 and 2 may attach. Absent proof
of defect under those Sections, however, courts do not impose liability based on a conclusion that an entire product category should
not have been distributed in the first instance. That is, courts have
not imposed liability for categories of products that are generally
available and widely used and consumed, solely on the ground that
they are considered socially undesirable by some segments of society. Instead, courts have concluded that the issue is better suited to
resolution by legislatures and administrative agencies that can more
appropriately consider whether
distribution of such product catego129
ries should be prohibited.

What the Reporters fail to point out is that such category or generic
product liability has been imposed by several courts, 130 although reversed by the intense lobbying of tort-reform legislation
13
proponents. '

The continued treatment of cigarettes in this country as nondefective may be coming to an end due to common law litigation.

32

Both

handguns and alcoholic beverages may someday suffer the same fate.
It should be remembered that liability for such products does not
129. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. c, at 21 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
130. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and
Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994).
131. See Bogus, supra note 37, at 38, 56, 63-64.
132. After dismissal of the federal smoking-addiction class action in Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), the Civil Justice Digest reported:
[A] group of 60 plaintiff lawyers filed suits in New York State court seeking class action
certification for all nicotine-addicted smokers in the state and damages for all money
expended by the plaintiffs either to purchase cigarettes or to try to overcome their
addiction. The cases name tobacco companies individually and rely solely on New
York law. The suits allege fraud by the companies in concealing the addicitive power of
nicotine, false advertising, violations of the state's consumer protection laws, and conspiracy in an attempt to overcome weaknesses that led to the Castano ruling. Cases
seeking class action certification are pending in state courts in at least 11 other states,
including Lousiana, Maryland, and New Mexico, and the District of Columbia.
Following Castano DecertificationDecision, PrivateLitigants Begin to Press Suits in State Courts,
CIv. JUST. Dio. (Roscoe Pound Foundation), Fall 1996, at 6.
The National Law Journal reported:
A lawsuit filed by flight attendants claiming they were sickened by secondhand smoke
can go forward as a national class action, the 3d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
Jan. 3. Miami lawyer Stanley Rosenblatt first filed the complaint in 1991 with 30 nonsmoking flight attendants. Accused of fraud, negligence, conspiracy and misrepresentation are American Brands, American Tobacco, Brooke Group, Loews, Liggett Group,
Lorillard, R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris. The companies said they plan to seek a
rehearing.
Green Light on Smoke Suit, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at A8.
According to the Civil Justice Digest, supra at 6, sixteen states have sued "the tobacco industry to recoup Mediciad costs." Los Angeles and San Fransisico "appear to be first municipalities
to do so." Id. at 7.
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mean that a product category should be "prohibited," as the Reporters suggest, but merely that a product and its users should bear the
cost of the unreasonable dangers the product imposes on society.
It is a lame excuse to say that issues of social desirability or undesirability of a product are better left to the legislatures. Social policy
decisions of major significance are regularly made by juries, not just in
products liability litigation but across the spectrum of social concerns.
The legislatures have reversed some of these decisions, and may reverse more. But when such reversals come as a result of intense, bigbusiness, political lobbying, the propriety of such reversals is subject
to serious question.
Another area in which the Reporters would move dramatically to
restrict risk-benefit analysis in design litigation is that of prescription
drugs and medical devices. 133 Section 8(c) of the proposed Restatement (Third) states:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe
due to defective design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its
foreseeable therapeutic benefits so that no reasonable health care
provider, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits,
would
134 prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients.
This section would impose a well-nigh impossible standard for the
plaintiff to meet, since, presumably, to defeat a prescription drug or
medical device design claim a defendant would only need to produce a
single health care provider to testify that he would prescribe the drug
or medical device for a "class of patients" while knowing of its "foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits."'1 35 Presumably, the issue of
133. See generally Teresa Moran Schwartz, PrescriptionProducts and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357 (1994).

134. RESTATEMENT (TrRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 8(c) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995).
135. 72nd Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 277.
As one commentator has noted:
Extension of this broad immunity to medical devices is enigmatic. The Reporters'
comments proclaim that both medical devices and prescription drugs are currently
judged by negligence standards, yet they cite only eight decisions from six jurisdictions
as authority-clearly not a majority position. Given the ubiquity of medical devices in
current products liability litigation, the proposed Restatement (Third) would effectively
squelch the chances of recovery for those harmed by medical devices such as silicone
breast implants, the Bjork-Shiley heart valve, and the Dalkon Shield. More careful
consideration is required before medical devices are added to a list of immunized product manufacturers...
Along the same lines, one must wonder why the liability immunization line is
drawn at prescription drugs. If the argument is based upon unforeseeable consequences of interaction with the human body, is it not true that over-the-counter (OTC)
drugs may have equally unforeseeable hazards? Indeed, the line between many pre-
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design defectiveness could never arise in this context until the dangers
were actually known by the health care provider (not the manufacturer), since until such time the type of evidence that would make the
issue litigable would not be available. This section presents the spectre of negligence, or even fraud, on the part of the manufacturer with
no potential of design liability because the danger is unknown to
health care providers.

The Reporters' Notes to section 8(c) recognize that "in recent
years many courts have imposed limited judicial review [of the reasonableness of design] on this special category of products,"' 136 but they

choose to disregard this developing trend. The rationale given is that
section 8(c) "shows appropriate deference to the regulated market,
where the FDA and learned intermediaries select which drugs should
scription and non-prescription drugs is arbitrary. Anyone who watches television can
testify to the fact that many OTC drugs are former prescription drugs which are "now
available without a prescription." Why is it that the manufacturer of a drug must face
dramatically expanded liability when he decides to obtain FDA approval to market it
over-the-counter? Does not such a double standard provide a strong disincentive for
manufacturers to attempt to seek OTC status for their drugs? If so, will this not hurt
the economy and consumer freedom by producing fewer OTC drugs from which to
choose? If such a liability standard does not provide a disincentive to seek OTC classification, does this not indicate that the difference between negligence and strict liability
is not so severe that it would distort normal marketplace decision-making?
Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a Unified Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1277, 1332-33 (1994).
At the annual meeting of the American Law Institute, May 18, 1995, Professor Howard A.
Latin moved that the "no reasonable health care provider" language of § 8(c) be changed to
read "reasonable health care providers.., would not." 72nd Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at
276. Mr. Karl E. Seib, Jr. objected because the amendment would "allow a jury to overrule the
Food and Drug Administration merely by proving that more than one reasonable health care
provider would not prescribe the drug for any class of patients." Id. Professor Richard N. Pearson also objected on the ground that there "might be a circumstance where reasonable health
care providers would disagree-that is, some would not prescribe, some would prescribe-and
under this version that would be enough." Id. Professor Latin replied: "All I wanted to do was
make clear that it should be an objective standard, not an individual subjective standard. I didn't
intend to change the general drift, so-" Id. at 277.
Then the following colloquy took place between the Director and Professor Latin:
DIRECTOR HAZARD: Why don't we treat that as a suggestion for the Reporters.
They understand the substance of your point, Mr. Latin.
PROFESSOR LATIN: Fine.
DIRECTOR HAZARD: They understand the problem of locution, and I direct the
Reporters to reexamine this language with both of those considerations in mind, and I
think that will take care of that part.
PROFESSOR LATIN: It will for me.
SECOND VICE PRESIDENT TRAYNOR: Then you would not require a vote on your
proposal?
PROFESSOR LATIN: Not on that phrase, no, as long as they are willing to rethink
the language, and then there will be a later opportunity to discuss it.
Id. Thus a matter of major consequence was apparently reduced to a "problem of locution."
136. RESTATEMENT (TInRD) OF TORTS: PRODuCrS LIABILITY § 8 cmt. f, at 225 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
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be available."'1 37 This rationale gives much greater credence to safety
regulatory effect provided by the FDA and learned intermediaries
than many persons would be willing to give, and shows much more
reliance on those entities than is justified by existing and developing
law.
Section 8(c) is a risk-benefit analysis without the requirement of a
reasonable alternative design, but the analysis is tilted heavily in favor
of the manufacturer. The Reporters have stated their reason for this
skewing of the playing field:
Unlike most products, which confer essentially the same benefits to
all users, prescription drugs and medical devices have the capacity to
do great harm or great good depending on the patient. Accordingly,

liability will138
attach only if the design cannot be justified for any class
of patients.
This statement is questionable on a couple of grounds. First, most
products do not confer "essentially the same benefits to all users," nor
do they confer the same harms. Under traditional risk-benefit analysis, one looks to the overall risk and benefit, and not to the risk or
benefit to subcategories of society. Second, by using a reasonable alternative design approach-which is curiously rejected here-a product that is useful to a subclass of patients may be of even greater use
to that class if redesigned. One can only speculate as to whether there
are other reasons why the Reporters believe that prescription drug
and medical device manufacturers should receive most favored treatment in design litigation.
The risk-benefit test as applied to products generally has its drawbacks. As Professor Marshall Shapo has well pointed out, the average
jury cannot apply the test with any identifiable degree of precision
(which is presumably a desideratum of the Reporters), because the
jury has no meaningful way of assessing the amount of potential fu137. Id. at 227. Compare id. § 7(b), where product compliance with a statute or regulation is
"some evidence" of nondefectiveness "but does not necessarily preclude as a matter of law a
finding of product defect." A Reporters' Note to this section states:
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions hold that compliance with product safety
regulation is relevant and admissible on the question of defectiveness, but is not necessarily controlling.
Id. § 7(b), Reporters' Note, at 205.
The Reporters cite cases involving FDA compliance in support of this proposition. See id. at
205-06; cf. Hill v. Searle Labs, 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[Wle think that in the case of
IUDs, prescribing physicians do not make an individualized medical judgment."). The learned
intermediary doctrine may have outlived its usefulness. See Nancy Plant, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Some New Medicine For an Old Ailment, 81 IowA L. Rav. 1007 (1997).
138. RESTATEMENT (THmn) OF ToRts: PRoDutrs LIABiLTry § 8 cmt. f, at 227 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995) (emphasis added).
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ture risks from a product. 139 Also, even if those risks could be fairly
accurately estimated, the test has an ugly aspect of appearing to weigh
economic costs against human lives. 14° It is for these reasons that the
consumer expectations test, correctly applied, fills a significant void
left by risk-utility analysis.
IV.

CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS

The consumer expectations standard for determining products liability reflects the "ordinary purposes" basis of the implied warranty
of merchantability. 141 It is also the standard widely used as the basis
for products liability in strict tort under section 402A of the Restatement (Second).142 It is the standard which the Reporters of the proposed Restatement (Third) are anxious to lay to rest, at least as the
controlling standard for determining products liability and, especially,
design liability. As they say in comment f to section 2:
That concept does not take into account whether the proposed alternative design could be implemented at reasonable cost, or
139. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODuCrS LIABILITY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 131-32

(1993).
140. Professor Bogus, supra note 37, at 78-79, discusses how Ford Motor Company performed a cost-benefit analysis of potential rollover accidents for its Pinto vehicle. Specifically,
he says:
At Ford's urging to quantify safety benefits so proposed safety regulations could
be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis, NHTSA accountants had previously valued the
"societal cost" of human life at $200,725. This was a sum of twelve components, including, inter alia, $132,000 for direct productivity losses, $41,300 for indirect productivity
losses, $4,700 for insurance administration, $10,000 for victim's pain and suffering, and
$900 for a funeral. This, clearly, is a calculation only economists, accountants, and auto
executives can appreciate.
Id. at 79 n.417.
In Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the court held that the plaintiff could try a design
defect case against a cigarette manufacturer with a risk-utility test based on "a comparison of the
utility of the product with the risk of injury that it poses to the public." 644 F. Supp. 283, 287
(NJ. 1986) (quoting O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983)). In making this
comparison, the manufacturer would not be permitted to introduce evidence of the product's
profitability and the fact that "such profitability will be endangered if legal liability is found,"
since such evidence would "undermine the goals of greater overall economic efficiency and product safety." Id. at 289.
The Reporters pick up on this Cipollone reasoning in comment e to section 2: "[I]t is not a
factor under § 2(b) that the imposition of liability would have a negative effect on corporate
earnings or would reduce employment in a given industry." RESTATEMENT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e, at 24 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).

(THIRD) OF

TORTS:

It makes especially good sense to deny consideration of lost profits when determining the
costs of imposing products liability, where a product defect stems in significant part from a defendant's marketing of an unreasonably dangerous product in order to increase profits. Taking
into account the loss of such profits in a risk-utility analysis would result in rewarding the defendant for its reprehensible conduct of increasing profits by not incurring the costs necessary to
make the product reasonably safe.
141. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1977).
142. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TORTS § 402A cmts. g & i, at 351-52 (1977).
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whether143 an alternative design would provide greater overall
safety.

They would retain consumer expectations as the controlling test only
for cases of "foreign matter" in food, since the test "in this context
relies upon culturally defined, widely shared standards that food products ought to meet."'144
Recognizing that their proposed reasonable alternative design
standard of section 2(b) will prove to be only a Maginot Line if plaintiffs can still bring an action for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability based on ordinary consumer expectations, the Reporters attempt to foreclose this possibility by stating in comment m
to section 2:
The rules in this Section are stated functionally rather than in terms
of the classic common law categorizations. Claims based on product
defect at time of sale or other distribution must meet the requisites
set forth in § 2(a), § 2(b), or § 2(c). As long as these requisites are
met, the traditional doctrinal categories of negligence, strict liability,
or implied warranty of merchantability
may be utilized in doctrinally characterizing the claim. 145
In the other words, a design claim for breach of the warranty of
merchantability can be brought, but only if the reasonable alternative
design requirements of section 2(b) are met. Note that this comment
also subjects negligence claims to the section 2 proof requirements.
Warranty of merchantability design claims have been brought on
a variety of bases, including alternative design, a risk-utility balancing,
and ordinary consumer expectations. 46 The New York Court of Appeals recently affirmed the warranty consumer expectations test as a
separate basis from risk-utility for product design liability in Denny v.
Ford Motor Co. 147 In Denny the plaintiff recovered $1.2 million in a
New York federal diversity case for rollover injuries she suffered
while driving defendant's Bronco II vehicle. 148 She claimed the vehicle was defectively designed because the vehicle "had a low stability
index attributable to its high center of gravity and relatively narrow
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cnt. f, at 29 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. g, at 31 (Tentative

Draft No. 2, 1995). But see Kilpatrick v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Cal. App. 1992)
(oysters contained vibrio cholera), and Simeon v. Doe, 618 So. 2d 848 (La. 1993) (oysters contained naturally occurring vibrio vulnificus).
145. RESTATEMENT (TmIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m, at 40 (Tentative

Draft No. 2, 1995).
146. See generally Vargo, supra note 109.
147. 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).
148. See id. at 731-33.
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track width."'149 She also contended that "[t]he vehicle's shorter
wheel base and suspension system were additional factors contributing to its instability.' 15 0 The defendant contended these design features "were necessary to the vehicle's off-road capabilities.' 5' "The
rollover occurred when the plaintiff slammed on her brakes in an effort to avoid a deer that had walked directly into her motor vehicle's
52
path" on the highway.'
The plaintiff tried her case on breach of implied warranty of
merchantability and in strict tort; the jury found for her on the first
claim, but against her on the second.' 53 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified to the New York
Court of Appeals the question of whether these claims were identical
under New York law.' 54 The New York Court of Appeals answered
that they were not identical, and that under New York law "it is possible to be liable for breach of implied warranty even though a claim of
strict products liability has not been satisfactorily established.' 55
The court noted that the strict tort claim was tried on a risk-utility
standard, apparently without reasonable alternative design being a
necessary factor. 56 Under this standard, the court wrote, the jury
may have found "that the Bronco II's utility as an off-road vehicle
outweighed the risk of injury resulting from rollover accidents.' 57 At
the same time, the court found that the jury could have reasonably
determined that the vehicle was not "merchantable" or fit for the "ordinary purpose" of "daily driving for which it was marketed and
sold.... Importantly, what makes this case distinctive is that the 'ordinary purpose' for which the product was marketed and sold to the
plaintiff was not the same as the utility against which the risk was to be
weighed. "158

The court describes "this case" as "distinctive,"' 59 but its distinction may be shared by many, if not most, product design cases. For
149. Id. at 732.

150. Id.; see also Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Marinelli, [1993-94 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab.
Rptr. (CCH) 13,772, at 43,542 (Ala. 1993) (unreasonably dangerous stability ratio).
151. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 732.
152. Id. at 731.
153. See id.at 733.
154. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 42 F.3d 106, 113, 115 (2d Cir. 1994).
155. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 731. Specifically, the court remanded the case for a determination
of whether the jury verdict "was reconcilable . . . in accordance with... Rule 59(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
156. See id.at 738.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 738-39.
159. Id. at 738.
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example, the known utility of asbestos was as an insulation, while its
risk was that it might not effectively serve that purpose. (Surely the
seller would not admit that the expected risk was that the product was
carcinogenic.) The user, however, expected that the product was safe
to work with, as it was marketed to be. Similarly, the defendant, Yuba
Power, in Greenman likely thought that the utility of its shopsmith, a
combination power tool, outweighed its relative cost as compared to
similar products and to its complexity of use. 160 (Surely Yuba Power
did not think the risk was one of injury from inadequate set screws.)
Greenman, however, expected the product to be safe for its ordinary
purposes "as a saw, drill, and wood lathe.' 161 Indeed, "[i]mplicit in
the machine's presence on the market... was a representation that it
would safely do the jobs for which it was built."' 162 The utility of a
drug is weighed against its relative cost and effectiveness, but the consumer expects it to do its job safely: not to cause vaginal cancer, blindness, teeth discoloration, and so forth.
One reason the implied warranty of merchantability has been relatively eclipsed by strict tort as a consumer remedy in products liability is that warranty, when viewed as a statutory remedy, may be subject
to a number of strictures such as notice, disclaimers, privity, and a
statute of repose. Such restrictions, however, need not inhere in warranty, when treated as a common law remedy. Indeed, Greenman itself recognized that the statutory notice of breach should not be
required for a consumer warranty remedy, 63 but then went on to
recharacterize the remedy as one in strict tort presumably in order to
avoid any confusion between the consumer and the statutory remedy. 164 Many cases recognize a common law warranty basis of recov-

160.
161.
162.
163.

Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
Id. at 897.
Id. at 901.
As the Greenman court stated:

Like other provisions of the uniform sales act.. .section 1769 deals with the rights of the
parties to a contract of sale or a sale. It does not provide that notice must be given of
the breach of a warranty that arises independently of a contract of sale between the
parties.
Id. at 899.
164. See id. at 901.
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and dispense with privity, 166 notice of breach, 167 and the
effectiveness of disclaimers. 168 The Reporters themselves in the Notes
ery, 1 65

165. Comment m to section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS (1965), recognized that common law implied warranty was essentially the same thing as the strict tort liability
described in section 402A. But, in order to resolve possible confusion between statutory and
common law warranty theories, the Restatement chose the new term of strict tort liability:
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the liability, have resorted to a
"warranty," either running with the goods sold, by analogy to covenants running with the
land, or made directly to the consumer without contract. In some instances this theory has
proved to be an unfortunate one. Although warranty was in its origin a matter of tort
liability, and it is generally agreed that a tort action will still lie for its breach, it has become
so identified in practice with a contract of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant that
the warranty theory has become something of an obstacle to the recognition of the strict
liability where there is no such contract. There is nothing in this Section which would prevent any court from treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the user or consumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized and understood that the "warranty" is a
very different kind of warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is
not subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to surround such sales.
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m, at 355 (1965). In order to avoid the new

strictures being contemplated by the Reporters for strict tort products liability, the courts may
well return to the roots of strict tort products liability in common law warranty.
166. See, e.g., Frericka v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 460 (Md. 1976); see also, JERRY J.
PFULLIPS, PRODUCTs LiABiLrry IN A NuTrs-mLL 152-53 (4th ed. 1993).

167. In Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex. 1942), the court
recognized the widespread breakdown of the privity requirement in food cases involving breach
of warranty:
We think the manufacturer is liable in such a case under an implied warranty imposed by operation of law as a matter of public policy. We recognize that the authorities are by no means uniform, but we believe the better reasoning supports the rule
which holds the manufacturer liable. Liability in such case is not based on negligence,
nor on a breach of the usual implied contractual warranty, but on the broad principle of
the public policy to protect human health and life. It is a well-known fact that articles
of food are manufactured and placed in the channels of commerce, with the intention
that they shall pass from hand to hand until they are finally used by some remote consumer. It is usually impracticable, if not impossible, for the ultimate consumer to analyze the food and ascertain whether or not it is suitable for human consumption. Since

it has been packed and placed on the market as a food for human consumption, and
marked as such, the purchaser usually eats it or causes it to be served to his family
without the precaution of having it analyzed by a technician to ascertain whether or not
it is suitable for human consumption. In fact, in most instances the only satisfactory
examination that could be made would be only at the time and place of the processing
of the food. It seems to be the rule that where food products sold for human consumption are unfit for that purpose, there is such an utter failure of the purpose for which
the food is sold, and the consequences of eating unsound food are so disastrous to
human health and life, that the law imposes a warranty of purity in favor of the ultimate
consumer as a matter of public policy.
The UCC has approved the breakdown of the privity requirement in varying degrees, depending
on which version (A, B, or C) of § 2-318 is adopted. See U.C.C. § 2-318A to 2-318C (1977).
168. The ineffectiveness of disclaimers in common law implied warranty also came to be
widely accepted:
It is generally recognized that implied warranty is more properly a matter of public
policy beyond the power of the seller to alter unilaterally with disclaimers and inconsistent express warranties.... Where there is implied in law a certain duty to persons not
in contract privity, it seems preposterous that the seller should escape that duty by
inserting into a non-contractual relationship a contractual disclaimer of which the remote injured person would be unaware. Even as between parties to a contract, where
the law would imply in a sale the reasonable fitness of the product for ordinary purposes, it seems unconscionable that the seller should by disclaimers avoid the duty of
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to comment m to section 2 of the proposed Restatement (Third) cite
favorably a case where a warranty cause of action was allowed even
though the tort statute of limitations barred the tort claim. 169 The
consumer remedy of implied warranty rests upon "the demands of so170
cial justice" rather than on the intricacies of the law of sales.
A number of criticisms have been leveled against the consumer
expectations test. One judge dissented in Denny, contending that the
test was commercial in nature and depended on a subjective standard.' 71 Others have raised the criticism that the consumer can have
no expectations of safety when the product danger is obvious. 172 Conversely, some say the consumer can have no expectations of safety
73
when the product is complex.
It is too late to contend that warranty law is exclusively a commercial remedy. The books are full of consumer products liability
cases based on breach of warranty. 74 Moreover, the consumer expectations test is no more subjective than that of the reasonable person
selling merchantable products or shift the risk of defect, unless the total circumstances
of the transaction indicate the buyer's awareness of defects or acceptance of risk. This
warranty imposed by law, irrespective of privity and based on public policy, is more
aptly called "strict liability."
Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 431 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
169. Fernandez v. Char-Li-Jon, Inc., 888 P.2d 471, 474 (N.M. 1994), cited in RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 Reporters' Notes, at 125 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995).
170. Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
171. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 661 N.E.2d 730, 743 (N.Y. 1995) (Simons, J. dissenting).
According to the Reporters, the consumer expectations test "suffers from.., extreme subjectivity .... It is very difficult to rebut the contention that a consumer's expectations were disappointed." Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 1295.
For an example of "the extreme subjectivity" of this test, the Reporters cite Campbell v.
General Motors Corp., where the plaintiff without expert testimony was permitted to show that
defendant's product failed to meet "the juror's own sense of whether the product meets ordinary
expectations as to its safety under the circumstances presented by the evidence." 649 P.2d 224,
232-33 (Cal. 1982). Compare Soule v. GeneralMotors Corp., where the court said the consumer
expectations test should not be charged where the issue of design defect is "one of technical and
mechanical detail." 882 P.2d 298, 310 (Cal. 1994). But, said the court:
[O]rdinary consumer expectations are not irrelevant simply because expert testimony is
required to prove that the productfailed as marketed, or that a condition of the product
as marketed was a 'substantial', and therefore 'legal', cause of injury. We simply hold
that the consumer expectations test is appropriate only when the jury, fully apprised of
the circumstances of the accident or injury, may conclude that the product's design
failed to perform as safely as its ordinary consumers would expect."
Id. at 309 n.6. See note 185 infra and accompanying text. The thrust of the opinion seems to be
that ordinary consumer expectations must be informed by expert testimony in a complicated
case.

172. See e.g., Higgs v. General Motors Corp., 655 F. Supp. 22, 26 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
173. See John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 823 (1976).
174.

(1994).

See, e.g., JERRY PHILLIPS ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES AND MATERIALS 17-98
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standard. Indeed, the ordinary consumer expectations test closely
parallels the reasonable person standard and draws much of its vitality
from that standard.
The clear modern trend is to hold that obviousness of danger is
but one factor to consider in determining whether a product is defective or unreasonably dangerous. 175 Obviousness of danger may also
be relevant in determining comparative fault. 176 It is a misconception
to say that the consumer can have no expectations of safety regarding
an obviously dangerous product. A worker can surely expect that a
punch press, for example, should have safety guards even though it
obviously does not. 177 Persons might reasonably expect cigarettes to
be safe, especially when they are extensively marketed as such.
In fact, the risk may overlap and contradict consumer expectations, not only with regard to obvious dangers, but in general. The
risk-or burden, in Learned Hand terms' 7 8-may involve increased
costs, but it may also involve dangers. The Denny court said the risks
included "the risk of injury resulting from rollover accidents,"
whether off-road or on-road. 179 Nevertheless, a jury could find the
vehicle was not "merchantable" because it was not fit for the "'ordi0
nary purpose' of daily driving for which it was marketed.' 8
Expert testimony can inform consumer expectations. Indeed,
typically such testimony is required in design litigation and may be
used to establish a reasonable alternative design. It may also serve to
establish the degree of danger, as was apparently the case in Denny,'8 '
82
and in many medical malpractice informed consent cases.
175. See, e.g., Harnischfeger Corp. v. Gleason Crane Rentals, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 166, 175 (Ill.
App. 1991).
176. See Holm v. Sponco Mfg. Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Minn. 1982).
177. Jonathan Weisgall, in a 1977 law review article, demonstrated that unguarded workplace

machines account for a very large portion of products claims. Jonathan M. Weisgall, Product
Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of
Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035, 1057 (1977). Reporter Henderson, on the other hand,
asserts that the absence of safety guards is an obvious, intended design, and that manufacturers
should not be liable for conscious design choices. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review
of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1531, 1549 (1973).
178. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
179. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 743 (N.Y. 1995).
180. Id.

181. See id. at 732.
182. See e.g., Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 507 (N.J. 1988); see also Karns v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987) (an expert may testify that a product is "unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectation of the average user"); Mireles v. Broderick, 872 P.2d
863, 866 (N.M. 1994) (holding that expert testimony may be used to establish res ipsa loquitur).
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The advantages of the consumer expectations test are manifold.
The test reflects community values and customs, marketing practices,
express and implied representations, ordinary expectations, and a
sense of fairness. It soundly avoids the potential aridity of economic
analysis under a risk-utility test. The consumer expectations test permits the jury to do what the jury is best at doing: resolving questions
of fairness.
V.

STRICT LIABILITY

The primary thrust of the proposed Restatement (Third) is a frontal assault on strict liability, for which section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) stands. The proposed Restatement rejects consumer expectations as the controlling standard because that standard judges the
product itself rather than the conduct of the manufacturer. 183 The
proposed Restatement rejects presumed seller knowledge, 184 which
mirrors consumer expectations, 185 because that standard is one of
strict liability focusing on the product itself. It also rejects the date of
trial as the relevant time for determining defectiveness, 186 even
though reasonable expectations cannot be determined until the product has been tested by consumer use. 187 Finally, it rejects a substitute
product standard-and rigidly requires proof of a reasonable alterna183. See RESTATEMENT (Ti-nRi) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f, at 29 (Tentative
Draft No.2, 1995). But see Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (Or. 1974) (consumer expectation is a relevant factor).
184. See forseeability language of RESTATEMENT (T-mRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). But see John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965), for the leading explication of the presumed-seller-knowledge standard.
185. As one court stated:
We see no necessary inconsistency between a seller-oriented standard and a user-oriented standard when, as here, each turns on foreseeable risks. They are two sides of
the same standard. A product is defective and unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller would not sell the product if he knew of the risks involved or if the risks are
greater than a reasonable buyer would expect.
Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973).
186. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY § 2 cmt. a, at 16 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995). But see Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 902 P.2d 54, 63 (N.M. 1995), which
contains a clear statement of the reasons for using date of trial as the time for determining design
defectiveness.
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and comparable state rules permit evidence of post-sale remedial measures, taken by the defendant, in order to show feasibility or to impeach the defendant's
credibility. See FED. R. Evro. 407. If post-sale remedial measures are taken by one other than
the defendant, evidence of such measures is regularly admitted to establish date-of-sale defectiveness of a product. Bla-Knox Constr. Equip. Co. v. Morris, 596 A.2d 679, 681 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991).
187. The unreasonable danger of a drug such as DES, for example, and consumer expectations regarding that danger, could not be determined until years after the drug was marketed,
when that danger first began to appear.
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tive design-as the basis for determining design defectiveness1 88 because a substitute product standard suggests that the indicted product
should never have been marketed at all.
The burden of proof is the factor at stake in strict liability.
Should the plaintiff be required to show that the defendant knew or
should have known of the danger, and could have prevented it, at the
time of manufacture? Or should the defendant be required to show
that it should not have known, or could not have prevented, the danger? 189 Or should the defendant's putative knowledge of or ability to
prevent the danger be irrelevant, since these issues unnecessarily complicate the trial process, 19° favor the defendant with its superior
knowledge and financial capabilities to litigate,' 91 and distract from
the central question of whether a product has proved to be socially
unacceptable because it is unreasonably unsafe?
Courts have struggled with trying to understand and apply strict
liability since section 402A was first promulgated by the American
Law Institute in 1965. Attorneys have not been particularly helpful in
this regard because they traditionally think in terms of fault liability.
Regressive legislation and special interest lobbying have substantially
hindered the development of strict liability. Now, reflecting the con188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. c, at 19-20 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). Cf.Wade, supra note 184, at 17 (substitute product is expressly made a
basis for determining design defectiveness). But see Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the Boundaries of "Alternative Design" Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: The Nature and Role of
Substitute Productsin Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REV. 329 (1966) (arguing that alternative design and substitute design meld into each other, and that market demand and other economic considerations determine whether one product is an acceptable alternative or substitute
for another.).
189. At the annual meeting of the American Law Institute on May 17, 1995, Anthony Z.
Roisman stated: "At root ... tort law, § 402A as now written, is designed to decide who should
bear an unavoidable risk." 72nd Annual Meeting, supra note 14, at 193. On the following day,
Lee C. Swartz stated:
Proof of alternative design undermines the very nature of strict liability, which
permits a consumer to be on an even footing with a manufacturer by not requiring that
the purchaser undertake the burden of proving the specific nature of the defect, the
information of which the manufacturer has superior knowledge. Section 402A has acted as a burden-shifting device in this regard. It recognizes the superior resources and
knowledge of a manufacturer with respect to its products.
Id. at 204-05. Recognizing that California has shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in
design defect litigation, Reporter Henderson said later that day: "I think we make it clear in the
comments that this draft wants no part of that." Id. at 248. See also Henderson & Twerski, supra
note 36, at 1292-94 (the Reporters again make clear their adamant rejection of any burdenshifting approach to proving design defect).
190. For one of the clearest statements of this proposition, see Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982).
191. See, e.g.,
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,455 (Cal. 1978); Bogus supra note 37, at
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servative mood of the times, the American Law Institute joins the attack on the tide of strict products liability.
But there are a number of holes in the dike of retrenchment that
conservatism may not be able to contain. There is strict liability for
misrepresentation' 92 and manufacturing flaws. 193 There is products liability for harm "of a kind that ordinarily would occur only as a result
of [a] product defect"' 9 4 and liability for products with an "extremely
high degree of danger" and "negligible utility.' 95 There is liability for
abnormally dangerous products, 196 as well as for products that fail to
meet ordinary consumer expectations of merchantability, 97 whether
defined in terms of risk-benefit balancing or in terms of basic fairness.
All of these standards point toward strict products liability and
threaten to engulf the efforts at retrenchment.
It should not be assumed that juries cannot understand or apply
strict products liability. After all, the principle is not that difficult to
understand: an unreasonably unsafe product should pay its way, or
else not be marketed. If they are properly instructed on the principle,
they can understand it. As Judge Becker said in Bowman v. General
Motors Corporation:
Our faith in the jury system is considerable. We have seen as many
defendant's verdicts as plaintiff's verdicts in products liability cases
over the past several years, buttressing our conclusion that juries are
as impartial as they are intelligent. In view of their broad community base they seem to us well-equipped
to perform the fact-finding
98
and judgmental tasks involved.'
CONCLUSION

In 1995 Professor Bogus wrote an article on the issue of determining design defectiveness in products liability. The article began:
A war is underway. Battles are being fought in courthouses and
statehouses, universities and institutes, editorial offices and corporate boardrooms. The stakes are, quite literally, incalculable. They
include money and lives-no one can count how much or how
many-and even more, for the war will profoundly affect our funda192. See RESTATEMENT (TImRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABiLrrY § 16 (Council Draft No. 3,

1995).
193. See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCiS LIABILITY §

No. 2, 1995).

194. Id. § 3(a).
195. Id. § 2 cint. d, at 22.
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).

197. See discussion supra Part IV.
198. 427 F. Supp. 234, 245-46 (E.D. Pa 1977).

2(a) (Tentative Draft
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mental beliefs about the role of courts and the common law in democratic society.199

The average person-perhaps even the average lawyer-does not appreciate the complexities of the legal issue involved. Ordinary persons can, however, appreciate the basic goals of fairness that are at
stake. A standard of consumer expectations that looks to generic
product defectiveness comes nearer to implementing those goals than
do negligence or risk-utility standards of products liability. A standard of consumer expectations certainly comes nearer to achieving
fairness than does a restrictive standard that requires plaintiffs to
prove that a reasonably safer alternative design exists as a prerequisite
to recovery for product design defectiveness.

199. Bogus, supra note 37, at 2.

